The Threat of Smallpox: Eradicated But
Not Erased
A Review of the Fiscal, Logistical, and Legal Obstacles
Impacting the Phase I Vaccination Program
Holly Myers, Elin Gursky, Georges Benjamin, Christopher
Gozdor, and Michael Greenberger
February 2004
Holly Myers is a third-year law student at the University of Maryland and former
research assistant at the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. Elin Gursky, Sc.D.,
is Senior Fellow for Biodefense and Public Health at the ANSER Institute for
Homeland Security. Georges Benjamin, M.D., is Executive Director of the American
Public Health Association. Christopher Gozdor, J.D., is a Law Fellow at the University
of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security, where Michael Greenberger,
J.D., is Director as well as Professor at the School of Law.
Introduction
Smallpox, one of the most virulent and deadly diseases that ever plagued
humankind, has not afflicted a single person since the World Health Organization
(WHO) declared that the disease had been eradicated in 1980 following an intensive,
worldwide vaccination program.1 Although WHO subsequently allowed the United
States and the Soviet Union to retain samples of variola,2 the etiological agent of
smallpox, the disease began fading from the memories of most Americans.
Nearly a quarter century later, the disease has entered U.S. consciousness once
again as intelligence suggests that other countries besides the two depositary
nations have retained or obtained variola.3 The fall of the Soviet Union and the
resulting economic chaos have displaced many of the Soviet germ weapons experts
from their jobs, leaving them vulnerable to the monetary enticements of terrorists
and of nations interested in obtaining smallpox.4 Moreover, while the existence of
international treaties prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition, and use of biological weapons may prevent a signatory from using
weaponized smallpox,5, 6 the treaties certainly do not bind subnational actors such as
terrorists. Nor are these elusive terrorist organizations likely to fear the sort of
retaliation that might deter a nation from deploying weaponized smallpox.
The probability of a smallpox bioterrorist event remains unknown, but the level of
vulnerability of the United States population makes the threat too great to ignore.
The U.S. smallpox vaccination program ended in 1972, leaving 119 million Americans
fully susceptible to the disease in 2003.7 The 157 million U.S. citizens vaccinated
before that time likely have little or no protection left.8 Accordingly, on 24 January
2003, the U.S. government began Phase I of a proposed multiphase smallpox
vaccination program by targeting approximately 500,000 frontline health workers
throughout the country. A year later, however, fewer than 10% of the original goal
of civilian healthcare workers—only 39,353—volunteered to receive vaccinations.9

Given the lofty goals of this program and the putative bioterrorist threat, in this
article we seek to discover the reasons the Phase I program did not achieve its initial
vaccination goals. After a general introduction to smallpox, its use as a weapon, and
the rationale behind implementing Phase I, we investigate the federal smallpox
vaccine compensation and liability protections, as well as the program funding
strategies and volunteer recruitment tactics that contributed to, or detracted from,
the goals of the smallpox vaccination program.
Study Methodology
Twenty states were selected for participation in this study by calculating the ratio of
persons vaccinated to the number of anticipated vaccination volunteers. The
surrogate for volunteers was the number of doses of vaccine ordered from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The states were divided into two
groups for comparison purposes: “high yield” and “low yield.” The states with the ten
highest ratios were determined to be the high-yield states, while the states with the
ten lowest ratios were determined to be the low-yield states. Data used to calculate
the total number of vaccinations administered were taken from the CDC’s “Smallpox
Vaccination Report Status and Adverse Events,” 21 March 2003.10 Calculations for
anticipated numbers of vaccinations were based upon the CDC report “Smallpox
Vaccination Program Vaccine Doses Shipped and Released for Use.”11
The study engaged the public health perspective by interviewing state health
department bioterrorism coordinators or, in some cases, a specific smallpox program
coordinator for each of the 20 selected states that were invited to participate. These
individuals were selected because they worked in conjunction with the state
epidemiologists, immunization program managers, and health officials and because
they were responsible for crafting a plan within the framework of the CDC’s “Interim
Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines.”12 The initial invitation to participate in the
study was made via a formal letter. A follow-up phone call was placed to confirm
interest and to schedule a time for the telephone interview. A pilot-tested
questionnaire guided the 30-minute interview process. Interviewees were assured
that their responses were not for attribution. All 20 interviews were conducted 20–30
May 2003.
This study was supported by the ANSER Corporation on behalf of the ANSER Institute
for Homeland Security.
Background: Smallpox—A Cycle of Threat
The elimination of naturally occurring smallpox stands as one of the most significant
victories of humans over disease. Variola virus plagued humankind as far back as
1350 BC, killing 300 million in the 20th century alone13 and scarring and blinding
millions more.14 The continued devastation of populations from the variola virus led
WHO member states15 to set aside a malaria eradication campaign in favor of a
smallpox eradication program. WHO initiated this effort, called the Intensified
Smallpox Eradication Programme, in 1967 and achieved victory by 1980 when it
formally announced that the disease had been eradicated.16
After the Intensified Smallpox Eradication Programme’s successful conclusion, WHO
began the Consultation on the Worldwide Certification of Smallpox Eradication to
decrease the number of laboratories preserving variola virus stocks.17 WHO

permitted the remaining smallpox virus to be officially stored in two highcontainment laboratories: the Research Institute for Viral Preparations in Moscow
and the CDC in Atlanta.18 Member states were asked to guarantee that no other labs
besides the two authorized facilities contained stocks of variola virus and that they
had destroyed any remaining antigen used during the Smallpox Eradication
Programme.19 In 1994 the Russian government, growing concerned over security at
the Moscow facility, moved its cache of variola to the Russian State Research Center
of Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), a Siberian facility near Novosibirsk, without
notification to or permission from the international community.20, 21 The Russian
smallpox stock remains housed at Vector today after the facility gained final WHO
approval in 1997.22
Despite these assurances, mounting evidence suggests that the smallpox virus—once
an essential chapter in infectious-disease textbooks, but ultimately relegated to
academic history and the memories of old-time medical and public health
practitioners—has returned as a terrible threat. Early concerns about smallpox
bioterrorism stemmed from the prevailing worries that Russian scientists, in dire
economic straits after the fall of the Iron Curtain, may have sold their expertise, the
virus, and the necessary technology to terrorists or hostile regimes.23 Furthermore, it
is possible that other nations have illegally maintained stocks of smallpox.24
In a December 2002 speech announcing the vaccination program, President Bush
stated, “Since our country was attacked 15 months ago, Americans have been forced
to prepare for a variety of threats … One potential danger to America is the use of
the smallpox virus as a weapon of terror…. We know … that the smallpox virus still
exists in laboratories, and we believe that regimes hostile to the United States may
possess this dangerous virus.”25 The President conceded, however, that vaccinations
would be a precaution only and that an attack using smallpox was not an imminent
danger.
Echoing the President’s remarks linking the vaccination program to the pervasive
terrorist concern, CDC Director Julie Gerberding testified in early 2003 that the
“stockpiling of smallpox vaccine was an important priority before September 11,
2001, and smallpox vaccine was already in production at that time. The events of the
fall of 2001 heightened concern that terrorists may have access to the virus and
attempt to use it against the American public.”26
The looming war with Iraq, a country with suspected biowarfare capabilities,27
promoted a new sense of urgency for a smallpox program. In the minds of many
Americans, the initiation of the smallpox vaccination program was linked to the
growing threat of war.28 However, despite earlier evidence that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction, such weapons have not been uncovered in Iraq
subsequent to Operation Iraqi Freedom.29
The probability of smallpox being an “imminent threat” is unknown, but the level of
vulnerability of the U.S. population is decidedly high. Few persons born after 1972
have been vaccinated, with the exception of some scientists and members of the
military. U.S. military personnel were vaccinated when enlisting and were
revaccinated every five years until the early 1990s to preserve the pool of vaccinia
immune globulin.30 Although recent research suggests that residual immunity may
last longer and be more powerful than once thought,31 the issue remains unresolved,

and most Americans, including emergency medical personnel, may be susceptible to
the virus.32
On 13 December 2002, President Bush announced a plan to begin vaccinating
volunteer health care workers drawn from the medical community in all states:
individuals who would be exposed to the virus by virtue of being first on the scene if
an attack were to occur.33 In the event of a smallpox attack, teams of protected
medical and public health “first responders,” termed Smallpox Response Teams,
would be able to vaccinate, treat, and investigate suspected cases to reduce the
epidemic proportions of such an event.34 The CDC’s containment strategy, known as
“ring vaccination,” involves isolating initial smallpox cases and vaccinating close
contacts to create an immune human buffer-zone around localized outbreaks. A large
and coordinated cohort of immunized first responders and other healthcare providers
would be an essential component of such a response.35 The President’s statement
followed a review by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) of the
states’ preliminary smallpox response plans, which revealed that the states, in total,
planned to offer vaccinations to about 450,000 individuals.36 This number was
consistent with recommendations made by the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices in October 2000. By estimating that each of the 5,100 acute-care hospitals
in the nation would require a team of 100 healthcare workers with a range of
specialties to respond to a smallpox outbreak, the committee recommended that
510,000 healthcare workers nationally be immunized. This recommendation
amended an earlier recommendation to immunize 10,000 to 20,000 healthcare
workers nationally after members agreed that the healthcare system would require
far more preparation for smallpox.37
The civilian smallpox countermeasures were authorized by Section 304 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which allowed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to issue a declaration that an “actual or potential bioterrorist incident …
makes advisable the administration of a [smallpox] countermeasure.”38 This
declaration also announced the scope of the federal government’s liability in time
and coverage for injury or death caused by the vaccination program.39 (However, it
was not until April 2003 that Congress created a no-fault compensation regime.)
Secretary Thompson’s declaration called for the voluntary smallpox vaccination of
four categories of people: members of smallpox response teams, public safety
personnel, “persons associated with certain U.S. Government facilities abroad,” and
healthcare workers who may be called on to “monitor or treat” persons in the other
three categories.40 Vaccination teams—typically a duty largely relegated to the public
health sector—required that healthcare workers and essential hospital support staff
be protected to retain the ability to treat patients exposed to smallpox within 7 to 10
days of an attack.
The Phase I Smallpox Vaccination Plan was launched on 24 January 2003, when the
first healthcare worker was vaccinated in Connecticut,41 after Secretary Thompson
delivered his declaration.42 As of 31 January 2004, only 39,353 had been
vaccinated—far short of the 500,000 goal. The Secretary has extended the
vaccination plan through 23 January 2005.43

Study Findings
Finding I: The Phase I Smallpox Vaccination Program Strained Already Burdened
Public Health and Hospital Resources
The smallpox vaccination campaign fell on a public health system bereft of
infrastructure and resources. Long struggling to meet the needs of emerging
microbial threats like West Nile virus, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, and
hemorrhagic E. coli44 and tasked to counter the increasing prevalence of chronic
diseases such as hypertension, obesity, diabetes, and generalized health disparities,
state and local public health departments had little capacity to take on the specter of
bioterrorism. The hospital and healthcare delivery sector was equally constrained by
a climate of increased regulatory burdens, revenue shortfalls, cost-cutting strategies,
reduced bed capacity, reduced on-demand purchases of consumable supplies, and
waning ranks of nurses, food handlers, and technicians.45
Shrinking capacity and resources were exacerbated by a limited knowledge of
smallpox disease and vaccination, presenting an educational challenge to public
health and hospital personnel. The United States discontinued routine smallpox
vaccinations over 30 years ago:46 most currently practicing medical professionals
had never administered a smallpox vaccination. To meet the goals of the Phase I
Program, physicians and nurses had to learn the basics. This included mastering the
use of the bifurcated needle and acquiring the precision needed to administer fifteen
“jabs” in the upper arm to maximize the probability of a vaccine “take”; screening for
medical contraindications; using a perishable vaccine (once reconstituted) efficiently;
and explaining to vaccinees the importance of post-immunization precautions to
avoid transferring live virus to susceptible patients and housemates.47
Beyond these specialized skills there was, going into the Phase I Program, a dearth
of knowledge about smallpox in the medical and public health communities. For
example, a nationwide survey of 2,661 practicing nurses revealed that most lacked a
basic understanding of the disease, transmission, and vaccine: only 1 of 5 was aware
that immunization given within a few days of initial exposure will prevent the
disease.48
The ANSER study indicates that when the interviewees were confronted with the
challenge of developing strategies to implement Phase I, they did so with very little
personal or clinical knowledge of administering the vaccine, evaluating
contraindications, and implementing adequate post-vaccination surveillance. Study
participants, facing a steep learning curve in bioterrorist agents and bioterrorism in
general, confronted a specific “new” disease requiring different business practices
and systems. The implementation of new skills and operations was afforded little
start-up time in an atmosphere exhibiting “very hyped up demand” and a “sense of
urgency.” Additionally, many of the interviewees indicated that they were caught
unaware by the perceived “detour” from the original biodefense preparedness core
focus areas—planning and readiness assessment, surveillance and epidemiology
capacity, laboratory capacity, communications and information technology, risk
communications and health information, and education and training—described in
the DHHS/CDC Bioterrorism Cooperative Agreement Guidance Document of 2002.49
None of these six focus areas specifically addressed smallpox planning.

The Phase I Smallpox Program loomed large as a logistical, technical, and financial
conundrum. On 22 November 2002, the CDC requested “pre-attack” vaccination
plans containing information on the size of each Smallpox Response Team, the
location of each vaccination site, the number of healthcare facilities identified to
participate, and the number of clinics needed to support this effort. The CDC also
asked states to address vaccine logistics and security, vaccine safety monitoring,
training and education, data management, and communications in their plans.50 The
states were notified that these plans were due by 9 December 2002 and that they
should utilize and redirect already released fiscal year 2002 preparedness funds to
support this effort.51
At the inception of the Phase I program, however, many states had already
encumbered bioterrorism preparedness funds for other programs and purchases.
Although bioterrorism preparedness and response had emerged as a key agenda
item of the federal government moving into this new century,52, 53, 54, 55 there simply
were inadequate federal dollars targeted toward a smallpox vaccination program.
This lack of federal funding presented a hardship, especially for the low-yield states.
Furthermore, as one low-yield state official noted, “vaccination was never a priority”
in the state because there were other pressing public health issues.
In March 2003, Secretary Thompson released to the states an initial 20%, or $280
million, of the $1.4 billion that had been appropriated in fiscal year 2003 for public
health and hospital preparedness. The remaining 80% would be distributed once
state preparedness plans were created and approved. In a statement announcing the
release of these initial funds, the Secretary urged states to use these monies to
support smallpox vaccination activities, which had begun two months earlier, and all
other preparedness activities already in progress.56 The administration released
another $100 million not included in fiscal year 2003 appropriations to the states in
May 2003 for the same general purposes.57 HHS did not begin to release the
remaining 80% of each state’s share of the 2003 appropriations until September
2003.58
The lack of smallpox-specific funding at the planning and initiation stages presented
a hardship to all the participants in this study. However, the ANSER study
demonstrated that high-yield states (n=6) were more likely than their low-yield
counterparts (n=2) to draw from state health department budgets and existing funds
to implement the Phase I Smallpox Program. One official from a high-yield state
characterized the use of state and local health department budgets as necessitating
“putting [other] work aside to do vaccination clinics.” Another underscored public
health’s role in preparedness and “national security” efforts, noting that the state
requested “redirection” of the bioterrorism preparedness grant to cover the smallpox
vaccination activities. A third state made a “good faith” assumption that the smallpox
vaccination program would be “within the scope of the CDC biopreparedness grant”
and proceeded accordingly.
Despite the best of efforts, the lack of specifically awarded smallpox vaccination
funding was an impediment to the Phase I program. Some viewed the vaccination
initiative as a federally imposed program without the benefit of federal funding, or,
as one state official noted, “an unfunded mandate eating the [state] money.”59 By
having to subtract money from general public health budgets, the states had to
decrease spending on routine public health activities such as childhood
immunizations and redirect staff from other disciplines across public health agencies.

Even after the federal government dispensed funds that could be used to implement
Phase I, volunteer participation in the program remains below 10% of the President’s
goal of 500,000 smallpox vaccinees.60 While this may spawn debate over whether
the initial funding was adequate, other considerations on a personal level and a
public health policy level also helped determine the Phase I outcome.
Finding II: Perceptions of Vaccination Risk and Smallpox Threat Contributed to Low
Vaccination Volunteer Rates
Early in the program, states needed to calculate the number of volunteers and
vaccine doses that would make up their Phase I goal. States did receive some
guidance from the CDC about the criteria to use for estimating how many doses
would be necessary,61 but it was described as “vague.” Most states arrived at their
final figure based on the number of acute care hospitals within the state, the number
of Emergency Response Teams, and the personnel needed for each team.62
Adjustments were imposed upon these calculations by estimating the numbers of
volunteers who might be screened out given the prevalence of medical
contraindications. Yet, when it came down to the precise number of volunteers,
states noted that they “just had to guess” or give a “ballpark estimate.”
States adopted differing tactics to cope with the guesswork. As this study revealed,
some states slightly inflated the number of doses of vaccine they would require in
anticipation of vaccine waste. Some states ordered extra vaccine to save for future
use. Others ordered extra recognizing that they could not use all hundred doses
before vials of reconstituted vaccine expired. There were states that decided against
a “fudge factor” and determined, instead, that they would rely upon the Strategic
National Stockpile should the need for more vaccine arise. The complexities of
calculating vaccine quantity reflected the difficulty of forecasting participation.
Once Bioterrorism Coordinators determined the potential number of volunteers and
doses of vaccine, they faced the problem of how to actually recruit volunteers.
Because the Phase I Program was voluntary, states needed to address the riskbenefit analysis that potential volunteers were likely conducting on a personal level
before deciding to be vaccinated. In times when variola ran rampant in the world,
the risks associated with vaccinia were immediate but seemed negligible in contrast
with the very real probability of coming into contact with the virus and dying from it.
Historically, the smallpox virus killed up to 30% of those infected,63 and it hideously
disfigured its survivors.64 The benefits of vaccination were immediate and invaluable
in terms of lives saved. In today’s world, where naturally occurring smallpox has
been eradicated and the threat of smallpox-related bioterrorism is unquantifiable,
vaccine-related side effects, contraindications, and rare (but potentially increased)
risk of mortality could weigh more heavily in the minds of those making a personal
risk-benefit assessment.65 The benefits may never materialize (although some
speculate that vaccination has an immediate deterrent effect for bioterrorists),66 but
the risks are immediate and may seem comparatively large to a potential volunteer.
The ANSER study indicated that states tackled this concern using a fairly uniform
approach: offer no incentive; just educate potential volunteers so that they can
make an informed decision.
Program planners began volunteer recruitment by identifying a target group of
people who met the definition of “first responder.” Some states used a committee
process to determine strategies for identifying and recruiting volunteers. Most of the

interviewees stated that they had not thought to use “perks” or rewards, such as
time off or bonuses, to encourage participation. Other participants noted that they
thought of, but rejected these strategies. One interviewee stated, “We tried to
minimize disincentives, but [offer] no incentives.”
Another participant echoed these sentiments in efforts to “stop physicians from
discouraging if not encouraging participation.” Other states echoed the sentiment of
“no carrots” and “no push,” and just a “simple request.”
Instead of incentives, states mounted vast education and advertising campaigns.
They assembled information to describe the federal program, provide education
about the smallpox vaccine, and explain vaccination-screening criteria. State
bioterrorism coordinators attempted to hold multiple meetings with hospital staff and
healthcare workers and other potential volunteers. Some sent briefing packets to
hospital associations, physicians, and nurses.
A review of the recruitment strategies used in states participating in the ANSER
study (see Table 1 for a comparison of educational initiatives used by high- and lowyield states to recruit volunteers) indicated that high-yield states incorporated more
intensive and multiple outreach efforts with target volunteer populations than did
low-yield states. One participant described a state’s repeated contact with acute care
practitioners as “beat[ing] them over the head.” Additionally, it was not just the
tenacity of contact but also the novelty of approach that led to success. One state
developed a 30-minute informational videotape, which it aired on cable channels in
two major cities and provided as video streams via webcast. This state also used
one-on-one meetings and small group breakout sessions. Statewide teleconferences
were useful educational strategies to recruit volunteers, as were individual meetings
with all hospital CEOs. While interviewees in the majority of high-yield states felt that
participation in the program was less a matter of “their own volition,” only one of the
ten low-yield states had engaged in education and outreach to the extent that the
majority of their high-yield counterparts had.
Outreach by the public health community was not the only source of encouragement
for potential vaccinees. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a powerful motivator for the
Phase I vaccination program: some states acknowledged that the climate of “war
and politics” increased the perception of threat and resulted in a surge of volunteers.
Other states were less convinced.
One study participant noted, “We were given no information of a threat so it was
hard to say ‘take this’ [vaccination] when we weren’t informed of the risk.”
Another participant stated, “It was controversial from the outset whether risk of
vaccine outweighed risk of an attack.”
Others felt that the risk “wasn’t well-articulated” or that concerns of threats were
misplaced —“What’s a smallpox vaccination going to do if someone blows up my
house.”
War and smallpox became a conjoined issue. One study participant commented,
“People in their minds really connected war with smallpox. [It was] very frightening
before the war happened.” Some states were willing to use this as an incentive for
vaccination; other states chose to avoid making these issues one and the same. But

while events in the Iraqi theater may have helped support the Phase I campaign,
once the war was declared over, 17 of the 20 states that participated in this study
reported that interest in smallpox vaccination dropped “precipitously.”
“When the war ended and no smallpox had been found, it became especially difficult
to justify a vaccination program based on a potential threat,” noted one participant.
Both high- and low-yield states felt the increased strain to weigh the threat of attack
against the possibility of adverse vaccine-associated side effects. However, while the
majority of states interviewed for this study agreed that the perception of reduced
threat instigated a steep decrease in vaccinations, a few acknowledged the
continuing threat of smallpox attacks from countries other than Iraq.
Swelling and ebbing vaccination participation was not only a reflection of the war’s
outcome and failed efforts to locate weapons of mass destruction, but also the
discovery of cardiac-related vaccine side effects among some recipients. By late June
2003, 21 cases of myo/pericarditis had been reported among civilian vaccine
recipients. Eight cases of ischemic heart disease had also been reported, including
five cases of myocardial infarction and three cases of angina. Two cases of
cardiomyopathy were identified three months after smallpox vaccination in persons
lacking any previous history of heart disease. Evidence suggests that the cases of
myocarditis and pericarditis might be causally linked with vaccination, but other
adverse events, including cardiomyopathy, not previously linked to smallpox
vaccination, have not clearly been associated with the vaccinations.67 Many of the
individuals interviewed for this study indicated that they had to modify their
strategies and decrease their expected numbers of volunteers because fewer people
would meet the more rigorous screening standards.68 A few high-yield states
indicated that they did not have to modify their Phase I plans because they began
early and finished quickly, completing their efforts “before the cardiac problems
emerged.”
Logistical, recruitment, and screening challenges associated with the Phase I
program contributed to lower-than-anticipated numbers of vaccinees, but the efforts
were not without benefit. A number of study participants recognized that the
planning initiatives contributed to overall preparedness efforts and some improved
relationships with the hospital community. As one participant noted, “[This] is giving
us luxury of having to prepare a team to be effective rather than having to learn on
the run.”

Table 1: Educational Initiatives Engaged in by High- and Low-Yield States
During the Phase I Smallpox Vaccination Program
Frequency in high-yield states

Frequency in low-yield states

Meeting with hospital CEOs or hospital organizations

6

2

Meeting with local health departments

5

2

Briefing packets

9

6

Presentations

4

2

Videos

1

0

Letters

2

2

Breakout sessions

2

1

Teleconferences

2

1

Minimizing disincentives

2

0

Offering a “no push” environment

1

4

Finding III: Liability and Compensation Concerns Curbed Participation in the Phase I
Smallpox Initiative
The smallpox vaccination introduces live vaccinia virus to the human host; it can
prevent the occurrence of disease if administered up to four days after exposure to
an infectious case. However, vaccinia comes with certain well-established risks that
must be weighed against the likelihood of ever contracting the disease. The vaccine
carries a broad range of sequelae, including mild side effects such as fever,
headache, body ache, and fatigue (1,000 out of every 1 million vaccinated) and more
serious life-threatening side effects such as encephalitis (14 to 52 people out of 1
million vaccinated).69 The vaccine is fatal for one or two people out of every million
vaccinated.70 Among previously vaccinated individuals, the rates of vaccine-related
adverse reactions may be lower.71 Contraindications to the vaccine include
dermatologic conditions such as eczema and severe acne, pregnancy, chronic viral
illnesses like herpes, a history of chemotherapy, immune system disorders such as
HIV-AIDS, and cardiac disease such as myocardial infarction, angina, congestive
heart failure, or cardiomyopathy.72 Additionally, the vaccinia virus can be “shed” for
up to three weeks subsequent to vaccination,73 posing an unconsented risk for
vulnerable individuals who are exposed to a recently vaccinated person. During the
military smallpox vaccination program, health workers and military personnel were
successful in preventing vaccinia contact transmission to patients, vaccinating over
450,000 individuals and logging over 19,000 worker-months of patient interactions
without infecting any contacts.74 (However, 30 cases of contact transmission
reportedly occurred between vaccinees and household or intimate contacts outside of
the workplace.75) Screening recommendations from the CDC attempt to limit contact
transmission of vaccinia, but the prevalence in the U.S. civilian population of the
contraindications mentioned above may exceed 10 million individuals, or nearly 4%
of the population today, a large at-risk contact group.76 Understandably, many
involved with the administration of the vaccine had legitimate liability concerns in
connection with the Phase I program.

Interviewees for the ANSER study confirmed that public health officials had early
concerns regarding compensation and liability, even, as one noted, “before the first
person was inoculated.” For some states, the full extent of concerns regarding
liability did not arise until the actual release of Section 304 (the federal liability
regime for Phase I smallpox vaccinations) in November 2002. But many also
underscored that it was the reaction of hospitals that led to grave concerns regarding
how little protection Section 304 afforded. Although the media, and to some extent
the unions, highlighted strong reservations about the risks associated with the
vaccination program, it was the hospital associations and their attorneys that
triggered the fullest measure of disharmony over the program. There was a
consensus that the media reported the issue but “were hearing it from the hospitals.”
One study participant indicated that larger hospitals stifled the start of the program
by “voicing concern and withdrawing support.” One state blamed its lower numbers
on “hospitals balking.” Some states admitted that hospitals felt cheated from the
outset by the program because they had the most to lose in terms of liability, but
they were omitted from the “table of decision-making.” They felt “blindsided” by a
program that was “targeted” toward them. A review of the study data indicated that
high-yield states, more so than low-yield states, engaged hospitals’ participation in
the earlier stages of smallpox vaccination planning.
Discussions with interviewees for this study reflected the different climate of legal
vulnerabilities between the public health and hospital sectors. The public health
community acknowledged that it operated under the protections afforded them from
sovereign immunity—the absolute immunity of a sovereign government (as a state)
from being sued. “Hospitals,” as one participant noted, “had a different environment
for liability.” While public health officials felt they had no choice but to support the
federal Phase I Smallpox Program, hospitals felt they could opt out if they so
desired. When one state hospital association hired an outside consultant to write an
opinion as to why the vaccine was not a compensable injury, that state’s
bioterrorism coordinator answered with countering legal opinions. Of the 20 study
participants, 14 ranked liability as a strong factor and 15 ranked compensation as
the strongest factor adversely affecting their implementation. The ways in which the
states managed these two concerns possibly made a difference in their relative high
and low yields.
A majority of study participants noted that it was a substantial and largely
unsuccessful effort to overcome the lack of federal liability and compensation
protections and maintain momentum to achieve their vaccination goals. A
comparison of strategies used by high- and low-yield states to manage concerns
about compensation and liability can be found in Table 2. Twelve of twenty reported
that they approached state workers’ compensation programs to negotiate having
smallpox protected as a “within scope of employment” activity. Some workers’
compensation programs provided compensation under the rubric of “on-the-jobrelated injuries” even though smallpox was not specifically listed. Other states
provided compensation case by case. The legislature of one high-yield state
introduced its own compensation and liability bill instead of waiting on a federal
amendment augmenting the coverage in Section 304. Other states assumed that
there was adequate coverage through existing legal system remedies that could, if
needed, augment the coverage provided through Section 304. The combination of
adopting a favorable interpretation of Section 304 for liability and maintaining open
lines of communication with hospital CEOs made clear contributions to the large
numbers of vaccinated volunteers in the high-yield states.

One of the state public health department’s strongest roles was to keep the hospitals
and volunteers informed and connected to the program. Ten of the twenty study
participants spoke of their outreach to hospitals. Meetings between public health and
hospital officials improved the transparency of the vaccination program, created a
venue from which to consider program options, and helped coordinate efforts to
track the progress of proposed legislation. Public health served as an interpreter of
the law for those seeking answers as a prerequisite to participating. Although the
states could not control how quickly and effectively the federal government resolved
concerns, some states stayed “side-by-side” with the issue to keep stakeholders and
first responders well informed. One state noted, “We would share as quickly as we
could any draft in Congress, [and] any interpretation released.”
Another noted, “We kept [first responders] well-apprised of federal efforts to allay
concerns.” Having a full-time attorney assigned by one state’s health commissioner
to the smallpox initiative, available at any time to public health officials, facilitated
dealing with problems as they arose. While several of the low-yield states
acknowledged the importance of keeping all parties informed, only three of these
states reported initiating meetings with hospitals and stakeholders or implementing
efforts to keep lines of communication open.
Absent adequate compensation and liability assurances, states resorted to instituting
more stringent guidelines for vaccination eligibility. However, while this may have
been a useful tactic to reduce employer risk, it also resulted in reducing the absolute
numbers of people who were vaccinated. Six of the ten low-yield states either
imposed or exceeded the most restrictive screening guidance provided by the CDC.
In contrast, only two of the ten high-yield states reported following a similar
approach. One low-yield state noted that even though it had instituted a
conservative approach from the beginning, it added further restrictions not listed by
the CDC, even prior to the incidence of cardiac-related outcomes. This distinction is
clearly illustrated by the difference in responses between high- and low-yield states
to the concerns that injuries resulting from secondary transmissions were not
protected under Section 304 (the federal liability regime for Phase I smallpox
vaccinations). One low-yield state’s solution was to screen out potential vaccine
recipients with any household contacts who had contraindications. In contrast, one
high-yield state allayed concerns by distributing Baggies with bandages to staff
members to decrease the likelihood of secondary transmission.
Two of the low-yield states did not use any of the above-mentioned strategies. Study
participants from these states expressed the belief that there was nothing within
their power to manage liability concerns. Both assumed this issue to be entirely the
federal government’s responsibility to resolve. One participant justified his lack of
efforts toward Section 304: “[We] couldn’t sell it because it was indefensible.”

Table 2: Strategies Engaged to Manage Concerns About Liability and
Compensation
Frequency in high-yield states

Frequency in low-yield states

Assumed that Section 304 covered liability

6

2

Approached state workers’ compensation programs

7

5

Used existing legal remedies to augment Section 304

2

0

Implemented regular meetings with key stakeholders

7

3

Imposed tougher screening process for contraindications

2

6

Relied entirely upon federal resolution

0

2

Study participants believed that compensation and liability were the two most
important factors influencing achievement of Phase I Smallpox Program goals (see
Table 3 for participants’ ratings regarding the relative impact of factors).
Table 3: Relative Impact of Factors on the Phase I Smallpox Vaccination
Program
Study Participant Ratings
Not at all/Slight

Moderate

Strong

19/20

1/20

0/20

Concerns by people in charge of the program about liability* (for example, hospitals)

2/20

4/20

14/20

Concerns by vaccine recipients about compensation for post-vaccination side effects

2/20

3/20

15/20

17/20

2/20

1/20

7/20

5/20

8/20

17/20

3/20†

0/20

2/18

1/18

5/18

Offering incentives to vaccine recipients (for example, days off work)

Ability to locate suitable vaccination sites
Perceptions of vulnerability to smallpox attack or risk
Delay in receiving vaccine and needles
Attracting attention from the media

*Some indicated that their answers depended on the fact that liability was a more prominent concern among hospitals than in public health.
†One of these respondents noted a delay in the arrival of needles for training, but not a delay in the program itself.

Discussion
Study participants affirmed that their Phase I vaccination efforts often were the
casualty of a rapidly launched program that placed logistical and resource challenges
upon an already weakened public health infrastructure, limited budgets, and finite
numbers of personnel. Despite these obstacles, in many instances the high-yield
states’ outcomes were commensurate with a greater investment of efforts to redirect
personnel and funds and to educate and ultimately recruit volunteers than were their
low-yield counterparts (although the numbers are too small to test statistical
significance).
By exacerbating the perceived threat environment, the war in Iraq initially provided
a powerful and motivating backdrop for volunteer recruitment. However, with the

war’s conclusion, interest in the smallpox vaccination campaign by both potential
recruits and, to some extent, their vaccinators, diminished. Ultimately, the risk of the
vaccine exceeded the perception of threat from a smallpox attack.
Unlike other pre-exposure mass-immunization programs with which the public health
sector has significant experience, the Phase I program involved an unfamiliar
antigen, a unique and unpracticed vaccine delivery method, and complex operational
and administrative strategies. Moreover, success demanded a strong—but generally
absent—partnership between the public health and hospital sectors to support the
joint planning and shared consensus and strategy required to construct a solidified
Phase I program initiative. Although some states saw the smallpox planning efforts
as contributing to improved relationships between the hospital and public health
sectors, in other instances the Phase I plan contributed to further strain.
We ultimately conclude that Section 304 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, which ineffectively
addressed smallpox vaccine compensation and liability issues, were perceived as the
most significant factors in failure to achieve initial Phase I vaccination goals. To that
end, we have undertaken a review of relevant liability and compensation legislation
to provide an understanding of the limitations facing potential Phase I participants.
Liability and Compensation Generally
There are two closely linked legal issues germane to the smallpox vaccination
program: liability and compensation. In the vaccine context, liability focuses on who
will be held legally responsible for a vaccine’s adverse effects. Compensation
concerns the reimbursement that the injured person or the person’s family receives
for injuries or death. These issues, as they pertain to vaccinations, are not unique to
Phase I, and in fact have been addressed statutorily by Congress in two other public
health contexts: the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 197677 and the
National Childhood Vaccination Injury Compensation Act of 1986.78 As shown below,
the two previous programs’ compensation and liability provisions were more
generous than the program that Congress created to address liability resulting from
the administration of smallpox countermeasures.
Congress Sets Phase I’s Legal Framework
In November 2002, Congress enacted Section 304 of the Homeland Security Act to
provide liability protection for injury or death caused by the administration of the
smallpox countermeasures at issue. This liability coverage extended to those
engaged in the physical act of administering countermeasures, as well as others in
the chain of countermeasure distribution.79 However, this universe of covered
persons seemed to leave those responsible for other sources of vaccine-related
injury or death, such as contraindication screening or patient monitoring, fully
exposed to liability for smallpox countermeasures.80
Unlike previous vaccine liability and compensation legislation, Section 304 did not
establish a no-fault compensation system that allowed a vaccinee to be reimbursed
for adverse effects without showing that someone did something wrong. Under the
National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 and the National Childhood
Vaccination Injury Compensation Act, injured persons needed only to show that their
injuries stemmed from the vaccine.81 If an adverse reaction resulted from the

administration of a smallpox countermeasure, Section 304 required the United States
to assume liability only for the negligent conduct that caused the injury or death.82
Section 304’s standard of negligence made it much more difficult and highly unlikely
that an injured person would recover any money for injuries arising from smallpox
countermeasures. For example, if a nurse administered a properly manufactured
smallpox vaccination according to guidelines, a person injured by the vaccine could
not be compensated, regardless of the vaccine’s inherent risks, because neither the
nurse nor the manufacturer had been negligent.83 The federal government was
aware of Section 304’s limited prospects for recompense, but assumed that other
programs, such as state workers’ compensation plans, would provide any needed
compensation for injury or death arising from Phase I.84 In other words, even if first
responders did not receive any compensation for an injury under Section 304, the
federal government believed that state workers’ compensation would readily
compensate them for their injuries.
However, there was substantial doubt in the first responder community that state
workers’ compensation funds could in fact legally cover these costs.85 Many public
health officials, unions, and attorneys explained that a high degree of uncertainty
existed concerning recovery from state workers’ compensation, because the scope
and quality of workers’ compensation plans varied greatly among the states.86
Additionally, it was nearly uniformly true that patients or family members who were
injured by coming in contact with a recently vaccinated person would not be covered
under most state workers’ compensation laws.87 This confusing state of affairs left
many potential Phase I volunteers wondering if the risk of injury posed to them and
their families was worth the benefit of receiving the smallpox vaccine. Furthermore,
the thought of workers’ compensation coverage for Phase I injuries distressed
volunteers’ employers because of the specter of higher insurance premiums,88 which
Section 304 did not cover.89, 90
Section 304 had structural flaws from the outset. At the bare minimum, Section 304
did not clearly define its scope of liability coverage, and in the worst-case scenario, it
left those performing vaccination-related activities completely open to liability for
injuries and fatalities related to smallpox countermeasures. In addition, Section
304’s negligence standard left vaccinees and their families little hope of being
compensated for Phase I injuries and deaths. While workers’ compensation programs
might have provided coverage, this was far from clear and, therefore, uncertain
enough to discourage potential vaccinees. The public health, hospital, and first
responder communities saw great risk in administering and receiving smallpox
vaccinations without plainly defined liability provisions or strong assurances of
compensation for adverse reactions.
Department of Health and Human Services Attempts to Address Fears
Faced with the growing unease among those responsible for administering smallpox
countermeasures over what was perceived to be the narrow scope of liability
coverage, Secretary Thompson hoped to calm those fears through the declaration he
was required to issue under Section 304.91 On 28 January 2003, he published the
statutorily required declaration in which he tried to broaden Section 304’s liability
umbrella by, inter alia, including activities peripheral to the actual vaccination.92
Rather than quell concerns, the declaration only added to program participants’
worries, because the purportedly expanded liability coverage was deemed to be

legally questionable—that is, it was viewed as being in excess of the authority
granted the Secretary under Section 304.93
Because of the confusion over liability and compensation, the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, an important union representing, inter alia,
350,000 healthcare workers, requested that President Bush postpone the smallpox
vaccination program just as Secretary Thompson was about to launch Phase I in
January 2003.94 The Massachusetts Nurses Association specifically requested that
nurses in Massachusetts refuse the vaccine until the government resolved
compensation concerns, as well as other safety considerations.95 By March 2003,
other prominent organizations, including the American Public Health Association, the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, and the National Association of
County and City Health Officials, requested the swift passage by Congress of new
legislation to close the gaps in Section 304 by clarifying the ambiguities over liability
coverage and by providing an “easily accessible” compensation regime.96 By midApril 2003, the nascent Phase I program found itself floundering, with only 33,444
out of 500,000 volunteers having been vaccinated.97
Congress Extends Liability Coverage and Provides a Federal No-Fault Compensation
Package
A legislative response came on 30 April 2003—three months after the first
inoculation under Phase I. Congress enacted the Smallpox Emergency Protection
Personnel Act of 2003 (SEPPA),98 which clarified and extended Section 304’s liability
provisions by legally providing coverage to those involved in important vaccination
support activities.99 Just as important, SEPPA created a no-fault compensation
regime,100 which would be administered through an agency proceeding rather than a
court action.101 Accordingly, there was no need to show negligence under SEPPA.
SEPPA also supplied medical, death, and lost-income benefits for covered injuries102
resulting from countermeasures administered to those volunteering before the
discovery of a confirmed active case of smallpox anywhere in the world.103 Despite
the statutory improvements, SEPPA raised new issues of concern to the public health
and first responder communities.
SEPPA benefits were made secondary to all other sources of compensation,104
meaning that benefits from other sources of compensation, for example workers’
compensation, would be subtracted from any potential award under SEPPA.
Therefore, the ambiguity of workers’ compensation coverage for Phase I injuries
remained a factor in deciding whether to be vaccinated. Injured vaccinees would still
need to wrestle with each individual state workers’ compensation regime before
understanding whether they would be compensated by SEPPA. Moreover, SEPPA did
little to alleviate the concerns of employers. For example, the legislation failed to
address concerns over increased workers’ compensation premiums, which meant
employers would potentially need to self-finance a portion of an injured employee’s
smallpox vaccine–related injuries.
Besides the problems mentioned above, even when an injured person was entitled to
recovery under SEPPA, that legislation imposed caps on awards, caps that were more
stringent than previous federal vaccine compensation and liability laws. For example,
the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 did not limit awards,105 and
the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Compensation Act’s caps, when taking
cost-of-living increases into account, were by and large considerably more generous

than SEPPA.106 Moreover, in order to receive full compensation for lost wages under
SEPPA, an individual needed to miss at least 10 days of work.107 Even when the
statutory benefits became available, SEPPA limited compensation for lost
employment income to two-thirds of the vaccinee’s income, providing an additional
8.3% of the income if the person had one or more dependents.108 The act further
limited this benefit to a maximum of $50,000 per year and a lifetime total of
$262,100, if injuries were not permanently disabling.109 Finally, these benefits
ceased to be payable if the injured person died from the countermeasure and the
survivors collected death benefits,110 which in turn were limited to a lump sum of
$262,100 or a maximum annual payment of $50,000 until the deceased’s youngest
dependent reached 18 years of age.111 As a result, a seriously injured, but not
permanently disabled, first responder such as an emergency room doctor who
hypothetically made $100,000 per year could see his or her annual salary halved,
and that salary would last for only five years—an especially troublesome prospect if
the doctor had a young family. Any claimant not satisfied with an administrative
award had the daunting task of litigating under Section 304,112 thereby placing the
injured vaccinee or survivors under the original Section 304 regime that SEPPA was
designed to reform.
The unsatisfactory nature of the remedies provided by SEPPA may be measured by
the fact that as of 31 January 2004, only 39,353 had been vaccinated for
smallpox,113 meaning that in the nine months following SEPPA, only an additional
5,909 people had chosen to be vaccinated against smallpox.
Concluding Remarks
The study assembled insights from low- and high-yield states regarding factors that
contributed to or distracted from their initial Phase I smallpox vaccination goals. We
hope that the information provided will offer guidance to key decision makers,
administrators, clinicians, and others who bear the responsibility for determining
whether a smallpox vaccination program should be reinvigorated (although
supporting or refuting efforts to revitalize the smallpox program was not specifically
the object of this article). This information may inform strategy for other initiatives
to protect America’s citizens from the ongoing threat of bioterrorism.
This study engaged a relatively small sample of states (n=20). Although an analysis
of factors between low- and high-yield states does not lend itself to statistical
comparison, this study in aggregate does support the importance of fiscal support,
communication, resource allocation and planning, and a sound legal framework as
being critical to the successful formulation and outcome of a pre-event vaccination
program.
Funding
A vaccination program carried out under federal mandate or for homeland security
requires adequate resources. Phase I’s slow start can, in part, be attributed to
insufficient funding. Certainly skeptics will point to the fiscal year 2002
biopreparedness funding totaling approximately $1 billion and query why the states
could not carve out a little to accomplish Phase I for 500,000 people. Several issues
must be taken into consideration in evaluating the fiscal support for the Phase I
vaccination program.

Over the past few decades, the public health sector has been deprived of the
resources necessary to fulfill its basic population health responsibilities and to
respond to growing chronic health issues, emerging infections, and other missioncritical concerns. There are no financial cushions within public health departments or
their local and state governments to assume new responsibilities in the absence of
sufficient and frontloaded funding—especially given dismal state economic
shortfalls.114
The administration charged state and local health agencies with preparing for the
smallpox vaccination program in the fall of 2002, but released no funds earmarked
for the endeavor until March of the following year. Instead, if states wanted to apply
federal funds toward this mandate, they would have to use or redirect the remains of
their fiscal year 2002 bioterrorism preparedness funds. Unfortunately, the
development of state and local preparedness spending plans had already presented a
considerable hardship,115 and states had very little left of the 2002 funds to
spend.116, 117 Consequently, as this study demonstrated, some states contributed
their own money to implement Phase I, but in most cases this resulted in a diversion
from routine public health responsibilities.
The sense of urgency expressed by federal authorities for initiating the smallpox
vaccination program was inconsistent with the limited resources and legal
protections made available at the inception of the plan. Additionally, quick
implementation of the plan required public health departments to cast aside
responsibility for other bioterrorism preparedness initiatives as well as routine and
traditional functions in order to concentrate on smallpox; they did not have the fiscal
or human resources to simultaneously handle all of these activities.
Moreover, recreating the infrastructure to deliver and monitor a vaccine that has not
been used in this country in over 30 years required tremendous resources, much
more than originally anticipated. Early estimates projected that the program would
cost $85 per vaccinee,118 but the latest data show that costs incurred by local public
health agencies’ smallpox vaccination ranged from $154 to $284 per vaccinee, with
an average of $204.119 As a result, the $1.4 billion given to states in 2002 for
general biopreparedness and the smallpox vaccination program was insufficient.
The fiscal burden of the Phase I program encompassed many components. Within
the cost equation are factors that included time for personnel training, program
planning, clinic setup and administration, vaccination tracking and monitoring, and
the vast amount of hours that were subtracted from the delivery of routine and vital
public health services.120 These costs—in light of the relatively paltry response from
volunteers—are further amplified by the estimates of vaccine wastage. Nationwide
the CDC shipped 291,400 vaccine doses, but only 13% were used.121 Thousands of
doses of vaccine had to be discarded in instances where vials of antigen were
reconstituted, but not completely used.122
Planning
Throughout the last half century there has been a well-documented schism between
medicine and public health. Medicine has focused on the delivery of illness
intervention to individuals, while public health has focused on efforts to promote and
protect the health of populations. The two sectors have diverged greatly and have
come to operate more or less independently with little communication.123

Through interviews with public health officials, this study indicated that some
hospitals were frustrated that they had not been sufficiently included in the smallpox
vaccination planning processes, both at the strategic and tactical stages. In fact, in
some circumstances, the apparent clash over legal protections and responsibilities
worked against other ongoing bioterrorism planning initiatives that had had hopes of
bridging the chasm between public health and medicine.
A critical challenge facing the nation’s public health system’s bioterrorism
preparedness efforts is to build an infrastructure capable of rapidly implementing
mass immunization services. To achieve this goal, public health will be required to
identify the risk groups, screen out individuals, and monitor and track cohorts who
are vaccinated, infected, and exposed, but not ill. These decisions and actions
demand seamless and reciprocal relationships between the public health sector and
the medical and healthcare delivery communities. The threats associated with
emerging microbial pathogens and deliberate biological attacks will place the public
health sector in the lead role for initiating and administering pre- and post-event
vaccination efforts. Greater integration and coalescence between the public health
and medical communities should be a critical objective.
To a large degree, the outcome of the Phase I program represents a failure to
convince many potential vaccinees that smallpox presented a personal and national
security threat. Although the federal government planned for smallpox vaccinations
prior to the most recent war in Iraq, the war certainly accelerated implementation.
This sense of urgency cast over the vaccinations faded after the war ended and the
United States found no evidence of an active Iraqi bioweapons program. In the
minds of the public, and many within the medical and public health sectors, the
federal government cried wolf and lost credibility. Trust—among vaccine recipients as
well as vaccinators—must be rebuilt if the smallpox program and other preparedness
measures are to succeed. That trust can come from careful articulation of the global
threats we face. It can come in the form of more careful, deliberate planning and
adequate funding should subsequent mass pre-event vaccination programs be
conceived. Whatever form a vaccination program ultimately takes, trust is crucial to
inspiring the states to pursue vaccination objectives vigorously. If the states are not
behind the vaccination plan, they will be less likely to seek ways to implement it
creatively. Just as important, states will receive plans for future voluntary biodefense
vaccination programs with skepticism, rather than optimism, if the federal
government fails to regain their trust.
Liability
The results of this study indicate that the lack of an adequate smallpox vaccine
liability and compensation scheme was one of the largest obstacles to the United
States’ achieving its goal of vaccinating 500,000 first responders. A comprehensive
liability and compensation package was especially necessary for Phase I, because it
was a pre-event vaccination of first responders, where the risks and benefits are
necessarily balanced much differently than in a post-event vaccination. Without an
active case of smallpox, potential vaccinees will likely not assume the current
smallpox vaccine’s risks without reassurance from the government that they will be
reasonably compensated, and those potentially involved with administering the
vaccine will not do so without assurance that the United States will, within reason,
assume their liability. A post-event mass vaccination of Americans would likely shift
the personal risk-benefit analysis towards receiving the vaccine, even without

adequate compensation, because the risk of being harmed by the vaccine is much
less than the disastrous consequences of contracting smallpox.
When Congress belatedly assembled its final liability and compensation plan for the
smallpox vaccination effort—three months after the beginning of Phase I—it offered
protection and benefits less generous than the National Swine Flu Immunization
Program of 1976 or the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Compensation Act.
Congress was most likely reacting to concerns that the two previous vaccination
programs were considered too costly to the federal government in terms of awards.
However, the cost of more generous liability coverage and compensation benefits for
the smallpox vaccination program or any pre-event campaign must be considered
contextually.124 For example, the Phase I smallpox program has about 500,000
vaccinees, plus a smaller potential subset of individuals who might become infected
by those who are vaccinated, for which the United States could potentially be liable,
rather than the continuously growing pool of child vaccinees under the National
Childhood Vaccination Injury Compensation Act, or the 40 million people vaccinated
in the National Swine Flu Immunization Program. Not only must the more modest
cost of compensating the fewer potential claims125 under Phase I be considered, but
lawmakers need to balance that cost against the enormous benefit of having a first
responder network in place to conduct post-event mass smallpox vaccinations of the
public.126
To be sure, the liability and compensation issues are complex, and they need a more
rigorous analysis than space permits here. For now, suffice it to say that we believe
that the additional liability and compensation protections offered by SEPPA were
inadequate. Public health institutions, academics, Congress, and the Executive
Branch must focus and create a better solution. In this regard, we are developing a
more probing and comprehensive analysis of a compensation and liability scheme for
pre-event biodefense vaccinations, which will be published in the near future.
Final Thoughts
Anecdotal information, reports, and even the comments of public health officials
interviewed for this study would suggest that the Phase I program was a failure, as it
fell far short of its initial goal of vaccinating 500,000 responders. However, the
program provided many opportunities to rethink the relationships, systems, and
resources critical to improving the nation’s homeland security. We must invest now
in strategies for planning and financing pre- and post-event vaccination programs
and in developing a legal framework to support their implementation. If this
administration and future administrations are serious about making a volunteer
vaccination program work, they must address the concerns of administrators and
potential vaccinees. We seek to provide a suitable framework.
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